Numerous recent studies have documented the role of veto players in determining policy stability. For example, Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2002 argues that political systems are distinguished by the extent to which political actors have veto power over policy choices; increasing the number of veto players (or their ideological distance from one another) increases policy stability by preventing dramatic policy change. The phenomenon has been observed formally and empirically (e.g., Tsebelis 1999; Tsebelis and Money 1997) , and others have documented the effect of veto points on political expenditures and budgeting (Bawn 1999; Crepaz and Moser 2004) , legislative output (Kreppel 1997) , the redistributive capacity of the state (Crepaz 2001) , tax policy (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998) , and income inequality (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998 ).
In addition, Tsebelis (2002) argues that having many veto players creates the opportunity for bureaucrats to play political principals against one another, giving agencies more freedom to interpret the law (see also Ethridge 1981; 1984) . For Hammond (2003) , the control of the bureaucracy depends on the rules governing policymaking-on the number of veto points-and also on the preferences of elected officials. Still others argue that delegation to agencies is more likely to occur when there are many veto players, and that delegation increases when veto players occupy distinct and separated policy positions (Hammond and Knott 1996; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Lohmann 1998; Moe 1990; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Woolley 1993) . Keefer and Stasavage (2003) conceptualize a broader impact of veto points, seeing an expression of their effect not only in terms of policy stability, but also on credibility. Credible commitment on the part of the government is central to the long-run performance of a nation's economy. If commitments cannot be made (e.g., to follow a set of rules tomorrow that exist today), citizens will be unwilling to rely on policy for making contractual, investment, or other types of economic decisions (e.g. North and Weingast 1989, Stasavage 2003) . For example, in the case of central bank independence, the choice to delegate, when there are multiple veto points, gives banks greater flexibility to reduce the bias of politicians toward adopting inflationary policies that lower long-run economic performance (see also Woolley 1993) .
The effect of credible commitments goes beyond central banks and monetary policy because the underlying purpose of the commitment is to insure that economic decision-makers can depend on policies being stable over time. However, the empirical connection between veto points as stabilizers of policy and the utility of veto points as a credible commitment by government (where that commitment is meant to support economic performance) is at best tenuous. Most recent studies have been limited to assessing the importance of veto points in the case of central banking even though theoretical models conceive of this commitment much more broadly (Keefer and Stasavage 2003) . Therefore, it remains unclear if veto points and credible commitments that work effectively in monetary policy translate to other policy domains.
In this study, we test the hypothesis that when political actors have more opportunities to engage veto points within a political system, firm level environmental compliance costs are reduced. Although there is no consensus on the macroeconomic impact of environmental regulatory activities (Jaffe, et al. 1995; Stewart 1993) , regulation can reduce the productivity of firms (e.g. Gray and Shadbegian 2002; Landy and Cass 1997; Robinson 1995) . 1 We argue that institutional points of veto reduce the likelihood that substantially new regulations will be adopted, whether proposed by governors, legislators, or bureaucrats. For example, we contend that greater bureaucratic discretion allows agencies to change regulations more frequently, resulting in increased compliance costs for regulated firms. But compliance costs will decrease when the decisions of executive agencies can be vetoed or checked by other political actors. We test this claim with data from the American states to assess the impact of five different veto points : (1) the ability of the legislature to veto rules and regulations considered or approved by the bureaucracy; (2) internal veto points like the presence of divided government; (3) legislative committee discharge petition rules; (4) the formal powers of the governor to shape policy; and (5) veto points that involve participants outside of legislative and executive institutions--the citizen initiative. Our findings suggest that certain veto points, such as legislative review of the executive, are more influential than others in lowering firm level compliance costs.
The first section of our paper reviews the logic of credible commitments in the context of regulatory compliance for environmental protection. Second, we specify a model that includes several core veto points. Then we present a statistical model of regulatory compliance costs and demonstrate that the core limitation on those costs is the legislative veto. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for understanding the relationship between institutional design and regulatory performance.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS
Under the rubric of devolution, state governments play increasingly important roles in implementing a wide array of federal policies and leading policy innovation (Dubnick and Gitelson 1981; Chubb 1985; Gerber and Teske 2000) . This is particularly true in environmental policy, where expanding states' rights has been viewed as a means for more effectively addressing environmental problems (Lowry 1992; Ringquist 1993) . Advocates of devolution argue that it could lead to more efficient and effective outcomes because states have the flexibility to develop policies that are most relevant to local problems (Chubb 1985; Peterson et al. 1986 ). Although there is disagreement over whether environmental policy has improved, allowing states to pursue different paths has increased policy diversity (Gerber and Teske 2000; Lowry 1992; Ringquist 1993) .
At the same time that power and responsibility has devolved to the states, bureaucratic discretion has expanded (Chubb 1985; Dubnick and Gitelson 1981; Gerber and Teske 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Laumann and Teske 2003; Woolley 1993) . Bureaucracies promulgate specific regulations that decipher legislative intent. In environmental policy, industries often claim that increased bureaucratic discretion has led to instability within the regulatory environment (Chubb 1985; Wilson 1989) . It follows that increased regulatory instability can increase costs for regulated entities (Landy and Cass 1997) . Veto points, such as legislative oversight of bureaucracy, may serve to counter this process, and thereby decrease costs.
We approach the relationship between veto points and regulatory compliance costs using the logic of credible commitments. Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2002 argues that institutions can be compared based on how having veto points establishes and promotes credibility. Veto points serve as credible commitments and shape the behavior and performance of economic actors (see North 1990; Qian and Weingast 1997; Stasavage 2002b; Weingast 1995) . Essentially, veto points are mechanisms for ensuring policy stability (Keefer and Stasavage 2003) . Firm-level economic decision making is more difficult if today's rules might dramatically change tomorrow. In other words, firms are unwilling to make capital investments, such as investing in pollution control technology, if governments cannot make credible commitments (Landy and Cass 1997; North and Weingast 1989; Robinson 1995; Stasavage 2003) .
Many of the prototypical veto points -such as how different legislative chambers can block each other, ways the executive can impede the legislature, or ways the judiciary can overrule the other branches -are virtually the same across the American states. Therefore, we focus on types of veto points that do vary, that is, differential institutional rules that actors can engage based on their preferences.
Credible Nondelegation as a Veto Point:
Our first veto point is the ability of the legislature to block the executive ex post -after delegation to the agency for promulgation of rules (e.g., Woolley 1993 ). State governments vary in both the presence and type of legislative review.
Some states have no provisions for legislative review, others have simple ex ante review of proposed regulations, and still other states permit review of both existing and proposed regulations (Gerber et al. 2005; Huber and Shipan 2002) . We develop a zero to four scale based on four different forms of legislative review within the structure of state government. States are scored on the following powers: zero for no legislative review, one if the legislature has any formal oversight authority, two if the legislature has oversight of existing bureaucratic rules, three if the review process is confined to proposed rules, and four if the legislature has review provisions over both existing and proposed bureaucratic rules. The data to develop this scale were obtained from 1988 to 1995 editions of The Book of the States. We expect that veto points based in legislative review will reduce regulatory compliance costs.
Canonical Political Veto Points:
We also consider more traditional political veto points. Our first is external: the presence of citizen initiatives. Researchers are divided on the influence of direct democracy mechanisms on state policymaking (Arceneaux 2002; Bowler and Donovan 2004; Gerber 1996) . We consider the potential influence of initiatives by including a dichotomous variable coded one if the state allows for citizen initiatives (Citizen Initiative).
Our two internal canonical points are State Discharge Standards and Governor's Formal
Powers. Discharge rules are seldom examined as a veto point, yet discharge procedures allow legislators to circumvent committee authority: if a majority of legislators sign a discharge petition, then a bill can be brought to the floor for a vote without committee approval. Our measure is the average value of votes needed, over and above a simple majority, in both chambers to successfully file a discharge petition; our data are similar to those used in Burden (2004) . We expect that states with a higher standard for implementing discharge petitions have lower environmental compliance costs. In contrast, Governors' Formal Powers addresses how executives with greater formal powers may check the legislature, bureaucracy, and in some cases, even the courts (Cameron 2000; Dometrius 2002; Huber and Shipan 2002; Teske 2004 ).
Ours is a modified version of Beyle's (1999) index of gubernatorial formal powers, but we exclude the divided government component of Beyle's (1999) original measure (see Dometrius 2002, 256) . We expect the governor's formal powers to be negatively associated with compliance costs. Finally, we account for arguments that political polarization influences economic decision making (also a concern in Keefer and Stasavage 2002) . Divided Government is a dichotomous variable noting divided control of state government institutions (governorship, upper or lower chamber in the house). We expect divided government to decrease environmental compliance costs because it will be more difficult for political actors to coordinate policy change. This helps firms anticipate a stable regulatory environment, keeping their compliance costs predictable and low.
Model Specification
Our dependent variable is drawn from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey. PACE data were collected annually by the Census Bureau from 1973-1994 and are widely acknowledged to be the most comprehensive and systematic source of information available on manufacturing firms' pollution abatement expenditures (Morgenstern et al 1998; Ross et al. 2004 ). These data have been extensively used to analyze various aspects of environmental compliance costs (see Ross et al. 2004 for a review). The PACE data are the single most reliable source of regulatory compliance cost data available.
However, because compliance costs vary with specific industrial activity (costs for pulp and paper manufacturing are different from those for metal finishing, (see Jaffe et al. 1995) our measure is adjusted to account for state industrial sector composition (Levinson 2001). 4 Due to data availability, we use data from 1988-1994. States like California, New York, and Vermont mitigate compliance costs in a variety of ways, such as subsidizing the 4 Levinson's index is a ratio of firms' actual pollution abatement expenditures to predicted abatement expenditures, with the predicted values based on the mix of each state's industrial composition, as well as national abatement expenditures by industry. An index score greater than one indicates that industries within the state spend more money meeting overall environmental regulations than those same industries in other states; scores less than one means industries within that state spend less money. 5 Data for the dependent variable are not available in 1987 because the PACE survey was not administered. Data for Toxics Release Inventory releases were not collected prior to 1988. 6 We explored the relationship between compliance costs and overall environmental regulatory stringency via the correlation between the dependent variable and the Green Index's sixty-seven item measure of Green Policies within a state (Hall and Kerr, 1991) . These measures are negatively correlated and the relationship is weak (ρ = -0.23; p > 0.05).
cost of pollution abatement equipment or providing other offsetting measures that lower compliance costs. For example, states provide loans to help facilitate compliance with environmental regulations and these subsidies may be more generous in states generally considered more innovative with environmental protection (Brown and Green 2001) .
Our independent variables include those reviewed above and a variety of additional factors that are likely to influence compliance costs.
Control Variables: First, economic conditions affect not only firms' operating costs, but also the cost of pollution abatement equipment and services. To capture this impact we include state industrial energy prices as price per BTU (Industrial Energy Price). Although government may be more willing to transfer compliance costs to regulated industries when industrial expenses are lower, we have no theoretical expectations for this variable. Additionally, we include the log of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) spending by state (EPA Spending). We expect compliance costs will increase in states where EPA funding is high. Second, regulated firms are not passive and may attempt to influence government activity. To capture the relative influence of business interests, we include the percentage of the state's Gross State Product that is attributed to the manufacturing sector. We expect that a higher manufacturing sector role in the economy will be associated with lower environmental compliance costs
We also address how costs depend on other factors. For example, states with large proportion of liberal citizens may be more willing to shift the costs of regulatory compliance to industry (Ringquist 1993) . To account for this we include an annual measure of citizen ideology developed by Gerald Wright (Citizen Ideology). Meanwhile, to assess the influence of support for environmental protection among state decision makers, we also include the average environmental support score for the state from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). We expect that states with higher average LCV scores will have higher environmental compliance costs (LCV Scores).
Our final set of measures is for environmental conditions within a state. We test the claim that decision makers in states with serious environmental contamination may be more likely to shift the costs of environmental protection on industry. First, we include a measure of reported toxic emissions (logged) within each state (TRI Releases). This measure comes from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) which is a self reported database covering a wide range of manufacturing facilities. Although TRI data is self-reported, it is widely recognized as one of the few resources that can be used to identify trends in manufacturing emissions over time (Daniels and Friedman 1999; Grant et al 2002) . 8 We also include Nitrogen Oxides or NO x as a measure of air quality from EPA's National Emission Inventory. NO x is regulated under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards because it is a precursor to ozone formation. These measures help account for both voluntary reporting and regulated emissions. As pollution increases over time, environmental compliance costs may also increase if decision makers are willing to transfer the cost of environmental regulations to industry. 
MODEL ESTIMATION
Our panel data consist of 48 states measured over seven years. 9 We estimate a generalized linear model by the method of Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE) Zeger and Liang 1986). 10 This is appropriate for cross-sectionally dominant data sets and yields parameter estimates that are uncontaminated by the effects of heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors (Zorn 2001) . We have repeated measures on the states' compliance costs, so underlying panel-specific effects can complicate the estimation of the common coefficients.
Heteroskedasticity is also likely if each panel's variance differs and there is variation of scale among the units. We calculate the robust estimate of the variance and rely upon Huber-White standard errors clustered by state. Finally, we account for possible serial correlation by including an AR(1) term.
The results of our model are reported in Table 2 . First, not all types of political veto points are equally correlated with lower compliance costs. Specifically, one form of vetolegislative review -reduces compliance costs more than others, a finding that should be of interest to comparative political economy researchers. In fact, legislative review of bureaucratic behavior is the only veto point that reduces compliance costs. As expected, the relationship between legislative review and compliance costs is negative: when legislators have this authority over agencies, bureaucrats are systematically less likely to shift the costs of environmental compliance to regulated entities.
[Insert Table 2 about here.] None of the other veto points exerted a statistically significant influence on environmental compliance costs. Initiative processes, divided state government, the formal 9 Data are missing for all years for Hawaii and Alaska, and one year for Wyoming. 10 Models estimated with pooled cross-sectional time-series frequently involve violations of OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms (Greene 1993; Kmenta 1986 ). While OLS estimates are unbiased in powers of the governor, and legislative discharge rules do not reduce environmental compliance costs. The lack of an effect for initiatives and legislative discharge may result because their use is not very credible in this policy area. Legislative discharge is not often used, even in legislative chambers where it is relatively easy to invoke (Rosenthal 1998, 145) . Thus, firms may not perceive this as a true veto point. Similarly, citizen initiatives, while used often in some western states, rarely address specific regulations on business (Bowler and Donovan 2004) . Moreover, the formal powers of governors also appear to have little influence on compliance costs. We suspect that these formal powers may be more influential under specific conditions (Dometrius 2002; Gerber et al. 2005) . Finally, the lack of an effect of divided government is less intuitive.
Although divided government may make policy change more difficult (making status quo commitments more credible) divided government may also be associated with shifting partisan control of different institutions and legislative turnover (Rosenthal 1998; Moncrief et al. 2004 ), thus increasing uncertainty for firms.
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It is curious that overall state political climate has such a limited impact on aggregate compliance costs. While our analysis does not identify why this might be the case, these results clearly suggest that more research is needed. It is possible that the broad political climate within a state is only influential under certain circumstances, such as during periods of technical innovation or shifting economic conditions. It is also possible that political climate sets a general tone for the burden of compliance costs and the climate simply does not change frequently enough to account for the short-term changes in compliance costs (Brace et al 2004) .
the presence of autocorrelation, these estimates are not efficient, and the variability of OLS coefficients contaminates tests of statistical significance. 11 We also estimated models that assessed interaction terms to explore the potential influence of legislators utilizing veto points. Specifically, we examined the impact of: 1) legislative review interacted with Republican control of the legislature and Democratic control of the executive (and all lower-order interactions) and 2) Gubernatorial power and Democratic control of the executive. Only one lower-order interaction was a significant predictor of aggregate Only a few of the control variables are significant predictors of compliance costs.
Economic conditions (industrial energy price) are negatively associated with compliance costs, as is our surrogate measure of industry political strength, manufacturing sector GSP. EPA expenditures are not a significant predictor of environmental compliance costs. Higher TRI releases are associated with higher compliance costs, suggesting that the state does shift compliance costs to heavily polluting industry. At the same time however, states with better air quality, as measured by declining NOx levels, are more likely to have higher compliance costs.
Finally, our results also suggest that the overall state political climate appears to have little direct effect on compliance costs. This holds true for both general citizen ideology and the preferences of political elites.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
An important literature, largely based in comparative political economy, has demonstrated the value of veto points in the policymaking process. We extend this theoretical perspective by examining how veto points in political systems might reduce the regulatory compliance costs of firms. We also expand the empirical foundation of these studies by examining numerous types of veto points and situating our empirical test in the American states.
We are able to assess the independent roles of five basic types of veto points: (1) the ability of the legislature to veto rules and regulations considered or approved by the bureaucracy; (2) internal veto points like the presence of divided government; (3) legislative discharge petition, which allows factions to block one another and the; (4) the formal power of the governor to influence policymaking; and (5) veto points that involve participants outside of legislative and executive institutions (the citizen initiative).
compliance costs. Furthermore, our core result, that states with well-developed rules about legislative review also have lower aggregate compliance costs, held even with the inclusion of these terms.
We assess the economic consequences of veto points, and contend that one veto point in particular, the ability of the legislature to oversee bureaucratic activity, systematically lowers environmental compliance costs. Although some authors imply that bureaucracies with considerable discretion can provide a stable regulatory environment (Porter and van der Linde 1995) , we argue that credible nondelegation to bureaucracy ultimately reduces compliance costs for firms. Therefore, credible nondelegation can be viewed as a form of government intervention in the economy that can support economic growth when employed and constrain growth when absent. We provide evidence for this claim in the context of state environmental regulatory compliance costs from 1988-1994 as a function of the structure of state political institutions, controlling for other state-level forces that may shape compliance costs.
In sum, our study has four useful contributions. First, not all veto points are created equal. We do not find evidence that some forms of political veto points, such as the legislative discharge petition, the initiative, formal powers of the governor, and divided government, reduce or increase compliance costs. However, we find robust evidence that legislative review reduces compliance costs for firms. Second, from this set of findings we conclude that it is not the existence of veto points, but their credibility and ease of use that underpins their economic impact. If they are not easy to invoke then veto points are unlikely to have a negative or positive influence on regulatory performance. Veto points must be relatively straightforward and easy to employ before they can be considered a credible commitment.
Third, our findings provide a unique insight into historical debates over the role of the legislative veto in constitutional theory specifically, and the political control of the bureaucracy generally (e.g. Ethridge 1981; 1984; Gerber et al. 2005; Korn 1994 Korn -1995 Moe 1990; Wilson 1989 ). Since INS v. Chadha, a range of scholarship has sought to assess how the judiciary shapes the boundaries of the separated powers. This scholarship has assumed the value of the legislative veto as a mechanism in the hands of an interested legislature. Our study connects the dots: the power of the legislative veto, as credible nondelegation, is that it constrains state influence on market forces.
Finally, one concrete economic implication of our study is that veto points can advantage firms by lowering regulatory compliance costs. We do not argue that bureaucracy or regulation necessarily increases those costs for firms, only that institutional structure affects regulatory performance by influencing policy stability. The costs of compliance are higher if firms are uncertain that the regulatory environment will remain stable in the short term. Veto points form the basis of such a credible commitment of the state to the regulated. 
